Against the conditional correctness of scepticism

Abstract

Stroud has argued for many years that scepticism is conditionally correct. We cannot, he claims, both undergo a Cartesian-style examination of the extent of our knowledge as well as avoid scepticism. One reason Stroud's position appears quite plausible is the so-called ‘totality condition’ imposed for this kind of examination: as enquiring philosophers we are called upon to assess all of our knowledge, all at once. However, in this paper I argue that Stroud's apparent understanding of the totality condition is mistaken. Evidently, Stroud thinks that honouring the totality condition amounts to imposing the strong requirement that we initially assume that we do not know anything about external reality. However, there is a weaker requirement available: that we initially not assume that we know anything about external reality. I argue i) that the weaker conception of the totality condition is most suitable for the kind of philosophical examination that Stroud seems to have in mind; and ii) that according to this same conception, scepticism is not conditionally correct.