Scepticism in African philosophy: A conversation with Jonathan Chimakonam on the notion of “arumaristics”

Abstract

The significance of scepticism for philosophical inquiry appears to have been well articulated by epistemologists in diverse forms, but none to the best of my knowledge has shown its place and significance in African (epistemology) philosophy. In this article, I engage Jonathan O. Chimakonam on his notion of “arumaristics” and unveil its sceptical nature by showing that conversationalism or conversational thinking promotes scepticism in African philosophy since it requires the suspension of judgement. The problem is that Chimakonam did not explicitly indicate this sceptical dimension of his thought. I argue that since arumaruka as “doubt” is the root word of “arumaristics” which is itself the bedrock of conversationalism as a method of the conversational philosophy, then “arumaristics” is sceptical in nature and conversationalism promotes scepticism, the type that focuses on “suspension of judgement”, in African philosophy. My primary aim is to expose the importance of the method of conversational thinking as a form of scepticism in African philosophy, the significance of which is to deepen our understanding, and further propagate the value of the method of conversational thinking as articulated by Chimakonam. I discuss scepticism from the perspective of Sextus Empiricus and my method is essentially critical, expository and evaluative.