Universalism and African philosophy

Abstract

In some quarter there exists a domineering view of philosophy as objective and universal in character. Any philosophical activity that fails to live up to the set standards is dismissed as retaining a non-epistemic/philosophical status. However, this view is not universal as it is opposed by a camp that seeks to defend what Emmanuel Eze calls the anti-import position. The opposing camp condemns both the philosophical method and feigned superiority of the so-called universalist approach. The camp that Eze argues for has come to be associated with the growth and development of African philosophy, and this growth and development has been encouraged to challenge the dominance of the universalist approach. In this paper I seek to revisit a debate between Ward Jones and Emmanuel Eze on the nature of philosophy in Africa in relation to analytic philosophy. Jones, in his advocacy for the universalist approach, opposes Eze's interpretation of philosophy in general and the standing of African philosophy in relation to analytic philosophy. I seek to offer some basic reasons that show Jones’ position as hardly persuasive. By so doing I hope to force a reckoning of what the nature of philosophy is for its practitioners who emerge from, and are informed by, diverse horizons.