Camus and the question of suicide: Addressing some misconceptions

Abstract

In this article, I defend Albert Camus’s account of the implications of the notion that existence is absurd for suicide against two key kinds of criticisms. The first kind of criticism, notably offered by Herbert Hochberg, is the notion that Camus’s alleged argument against suicide in The Myth of Sisyphus violates “Hume’s law” by deriving an “ought” from an “is”. The second criticism posed by Thomas Pölzler is that The Myth is inconsistent in that it simultaneously argues for ethical nihilism and the idea that there are certain legitimate ethical standards or virtues, such as sincerity. I contend that these criticisms obscure from the view of his readers the success of Camus’s main goal in The Myth, which is to show that life can be worth living even if existence were absurd and meaningless. Contrary to Hochberg and Pölzler, I argue that Camus’s discussion on suicide does not involve an argument against it as such and that in The Myth, Camus does not affirm sincerity as a virtue, but only as a matter of personal disposition. In refuting these criticisms of The Myth, I attempt to show that Camus is correct in contending that even if life were meaningless, it does not follow that we ought to commit suicide. I argue that Camus’s absurdism remains relevant since the question of life’s meaning and its relation to the propriety of suicide continues to have force in our secular world.