Friedrich Hölderlin and the access to being as ground: A critical examination

Abstract

Around 1795, Friedrich Hölderlin declared that the division between subject and object produced in conscious knowledge requires that we admit being as the ground of that knowledge’s unity. Interpreters usually recognise the importance of this claim for the history of philosophy. They disagree, however, about the status that being possesses for Hölderlin. Two groups can be distinguished. On the one hand, there are those who believe that for Hölderlin direct knowledge of being is possible. On the other, there are those who think that, for Hölderlin, being is known as a presupposition established in reflection. This article addresses the interpretations of two salient representatives of these positions: Frederick Beiser and Dieter Henrich. After presenting and assessing both of them, the article explores the possibility of an alternative understanding of Hölderlin’s conception of being as the basis for the subject-object division.