Non-human animal ethics and the problem of ontological kinds

Research Article

Non-human animal ethics and the problem of ontological kinds

Published in: South African Journal of Philosophy
Volume 43 , issue 2 , 2024 , pages: 125–130
DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2288765
Author(s): Wandile Ganya University of Cape Town,

Abstract

In this article, I consider the implications arising from the commonplace premise that the nature of being admits in ontological kinds. That is, there are actual, fundamentally different genera of being in the world, namely human and non-human beings. That for entities to be considered suitable for valuation under the same ethical rubric, it must be assumed that the general character of their mental states is commensurate. However, if we accent that it is indeterminable what kind of being an entity is without access to the phenomenological character of its experiences, then it may be argued that the ethical standards for non-human animals which follow from our inductive descriptions will always remain a matter of opinion, expressed from a particular point of view delimited within the metaphysical commitments derived from a human ontology of being.

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