Virtuous testimonial belief in young children

Published in: South African Journal of Philosophy
Volume 38, issue 3, 2019 , pages: 263–272
DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2019.1648122
Author(s): Shane RyanDepartment of History, Philosophy, and Religious Studies, Republic of Kazakhstan


I lay out the challenge posed by testimonial knowledge in young children to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge. In particular, I examine accounts from Greco and Pritchard and argue that those accounts are too demanding. More specifically, I make the case that young children can have testimonial knowledge without meeting the ability requirements claimed by Greco and Pritchard. As a virtue theoretic alternative, I argue that an agent’s belief must be epistemically virtuous, but that this may sometimes involve belief from a trait rather than an ability.

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