The Tacit Concept of Competence in J. S. Mill's On Liberty

Abstract

Mill is often the object of schizophrenic interpretation: he is either interpreted as a fierce proponent of negative freedom, i.e. a prototypical liberal who professes neutrality with regard to different conceptions of the good, or as a concealed moralist whose ultimate goal is to construct society on the basis of a particular and thick conception of the good. In this paper I will argue that Mill employs a tacit concept of competence in On Liberty, which allows us to account for these different interpretations. I will do so by focussing on the role of truth and individuality in On Liberty. Competence is a precondition for individuality, and as such, it is a threshold concept: those above the threshold are sensitive to rational argument and should be free to pursue happiness in their own way (because they are guided by the truth), whereas those who fail to meet this threshold should be educated and paternalistically be kept out of harm's way until they are able to find the truth for and by themselves.