Toward a Needs-Based Conception of Intersubjectivity

Abstract

Lawrence Hamilton's The Political Philosophy of Needs is an attempt to suggest an alternative to the current tendency of political theorists towards discussing politics in an overly abstract and theoretical manner, as well as their propensity to introduce an idealised-consensual picture political discourse. As part of such a project, the book includes a critique of Habermas and, more directly, of Habermasian advocates of Discursive Ethics. In one of its more provocative moments, the book offers an analysis of the opaqueness of the category of 'Civil Society'. Its conclusion is that political theorists would be better off to abandon this category altogether. Hamilton, however, shares with Habermas and the proponents of Discursive Ethics a view of politics at the centre of which is an ‘intersubjective’ conception of human nature. On this matter, and contrary to the Habermasian schema, the book introduces what can be termed as a 'needs-based conception of intersubjectivity'. This article suggests a critical examination of this novel conception of intersubjectivity, along with its strengths and weakness. More concretely, the paper seeks to examine: a.

the extent to which 'needs-based intersubjectivity' suggests a complete departure from an idealised-consensual picture of political discourse.

b.

the relations between 'needs-based intersubjectivity' and political authority.