Democratic pluralism and majority rule

Original Articles

Democratic pluralism and majority rule

Published in: South African Journal of Philosophy
Volume 18 , issue 4 , 1999 , pages: 347–355
DOI: 10.1080/02580136.1999.10878193
Author(s): Herman van Erp Department of Philosophy, South Africa

Abstract

What is the connection between democracy and majority rule? Democracy must legitimize itself by an appeal to some conception of the common good and not by majority interests. Nevertheless, it requires an implementation of the common good through some kind of majority rule. In this article a distinction is made between the majority principle, on the one hand, as a rational principle regarding the satisfaction of interests and majority rule, on the other hand, as a principle of procedural justice. The first is a neutral, want-regarding principle that can only have moral relevance under special conditions. It can be used by every one within abstract models for calculating the aggregation and fair distribution of total satisfaction. As such, it has nothing to do with the constitution of democratic political institutions and decisions. However, it is considered by many liberal utilitarian theories as a democratic principle. Majority rule, on the other hand, is an element of democratic decision procedures. Its legitimation is not based on a concept of priority for majority interests, but on a political constitution that must unite people under a conception of the common good that will guarantee their individual rights and freedom. Within a democracy, minority rights may not simply be overruled by majority interests.

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