What’s Wrong with Walden Two?

Original Articles

What’s Wrong with Walden Two?

Published in: South African Journal of Philosophy
Volume 28 , issue 1 , 2009 , pages: 1–12
DOI: 10.4314/sajpem.v28i1.42900
Author(s): Pedro Alexis Tabensky Department of Philosophy Rhodes University, South Africa

Abstract

Despite being eminently forgettable from the literary point of view, B. F. Skinner’s novel, Walden Two, provides us with an excellent opportunity, not so much to show what is wrong with mainstream accounts of free will, as Robert Kane thinks, but rather to explore another key and importantly neglected condition for genuine agency; namely, that properly lived human lives are those that are and must continue to be vulnerable to unforseable reversals, as Aldous Huxley speculates in his Brave New World. In short, I argue, perhaps scandalously, that one of the central conditions for genuine agency is that our lives are and must continue to be, to a large extent, out of our personal control. The promise of too much personal control, not too little (as Kane thinks), is what is wrong with Skinner’s social utopia.

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